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Abstract
The paper reviews some axioms of additivity concerning ranking methods used
for generalized tournaments with possible missing values and multiple comparisons.
It is shown that one of the most natural properties, called consistency, has strong
links to independence of irrelevant comparisons, an axiom judged unfavourable when
players have different opponents. Therefore some directions of weakening consis-
tency are suggested, and several ranking methods, the score, generalized row sum
and least squares as well as fair bets and its two variants (one of them entirely new)
are analysed whether they satisfy the properties discussed. It turns out that least
squares and generalized row sum with an appropriate parameter choice preserve
the relative ranking of two objects if the ranking problems added have the same
comparison structure.
JEL classification number: D71
AMS classification number: 15A06, 91B14
Keywords: Preference aggregation; tournament ranking; paired comparison; ad-
ditivity; axiomatic approach
1 Introduction
Paired-comparison based ranking emerges in many fields such as social choice theory
(Chebotarev and Shamis, 1998), sports (Landau, 1895, 1914; Zermelo, 1929), or psychol-
ogy (Thurstone, 1927). Here the most general version of the problem, allowing for differ-
ent preference intensities (including ties) as well as incomplete and multiple comparisons
among the objects, is addressed.
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The paper contributes to this field by the investigation of additivity: how the ranking
changes by adding two independent tournaments. We get a certain impossibility theo-
rem, either total additivity or independence of irrelevant comparisons should be sacrificed
in order to get a meaningful ranking method. Therefore some directions of weakening
additivity are studied.
Due to the investigation of the performance of ranking methods with respect to the
additive properties, the current paper can also be regarded as a supplement to the find-
ings of Chebotarev and Shamis (1998) and Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) by analysing new
methods and axioms.
Throughout the paper, we concentrate on the scoring procedures listed below:
• Score: a natural method for binary tournaments (for characterizations on re-
stricted domains, see Young (1974); Hansson and Sahlquist (1976); Rubinstein
(1980); Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981); Bouyssou (1992)).
• Least squares: a well-known procedure in statistics and psychology (see
Thurstone (1927); Gulliksen (1956); Kaiser and Serlin (1978)).
• Generalized row sum: a parametric family of ranking methods resulting in
the score and least squares as limits (see Chebotarev (1989, 1994)).
• Fair bets: an extensively studied method in social choice theory as well
as a procedure for ranking the nodes of directed graphs (see Daniels (1969);
Moon and Pullman (1970); Slutzki and Volij (2005, 2006); Slikker et al. (2012)).
• Dual fair bets: a scoring procedure obtained from fair bets by ’reversing’ an
axiom in its characterization (see Slutzki and Volij (2005)).
• Copeland fair bets: a novel method introduced in this paper by applying the
idea of Herings et al. (2005) for fair bets.
A main, somewhat unexpected result is that one natural axiom of additivity, consis-
tency – which requires the relative ranking of two objects to remain the same if it agrees
in both ranking problems – seems to be a surprisingly severe condition. First, among the
procedures analysed, only the trivial score method satisfies it. Second, together with two
basic properties, it implies a kind of independence of irrelevant comparisons. However,
the latter is a property one would rather not have in this general framework, since it
means that the performance of the opponents (objects compared with a given one) does
not count.
Therefore some directions of weakening additivity are studied. One of them turns out
to be fruitful, at least in the case of some ranking procedures, which preserve the relative
ranking when the ranking problems added have the same comparison structure. This
axiom is worth to consider as a watershed, application of procedures without it remains
dubious.
Another way to avoid the impossibility result is to restrict the domain, since inde-
pendence of irrelevant comparisons does not cause problems in the case of round-robin
tournaments. It will be revealed that fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets show
a strange behaviour even on this narrow subset.
The axiomatic approach followed offers some guidelines for the choice of the appro-
priate ranking procedure as well as it contributes to a better understanding of them. It
is important because, despite the extended literature (for reviews, see Laslier (1997) and
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Chebotarev and Shamis (1998)), characterizations of scoring methods (which provide a
ranking by associating scores for the objects such that a higher value corresponds to a
better position in the ranking) on this wide domain are limited, they exist only for fair
bets (Slutzki and Volij, 2005) and invariant methods (Slutzki and Volij, 2006).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the setting of the problem, the
definitions of ranking methods examined, and some invariance properties known from the
literature. In Section 3, four axioms linked to additivity of ranking problems are reviewed.
Section 4 proves that the strongest additive property has unfavourable implications on the
general domain used. Finally, Section 5 concludes the results, summarizes them visually
in a table, while the connections of the axioms are displayed in a graph.
2 Preliminaries
The following part of the paper discusses the representation of ranking problems, defines
the scoring procedures investigated later, and presents some structural invariance axioms
used in the literature.
2.1 Notations
Let N = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn}, n ∈ N be the set of objects and T = (tij) ∈ R
n×n be the
tournament matrix such that tij + tji ∈ N. tij represents the aggregate score of object
Xi against Xj, tij/(tij + tji) may be interpreted as the likelihood that object Xi is better
than object Xj . tii = 0 is assumed for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.A possible derivation of the
tournament matrix can be found in Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) and Csato´ (2015).
The pair (N, T ) is called a ranking problem. The set of ranking problems is denoted
by R. A scoring procedure f is an R → Rn function, giving a rating for each object.
It immediately determines a ranking (a transitive and complete weak order on the set
N × N)  such that fi ≥ fj means that Xi is ranked weakly above Xj, denoted by
Xi  Xj. Ratings provide cardinal while rankings provide ordinal information about the
objects.
Remark 1. Every scoring method can be considered as a ranking method. This paper
discusses only ranking methods derived from scoring procedures, the two notions will be
used analogously.
A ranking problem (N, T ) has the results matrix A = T − T⊤ = (aij) ∈ R
n×n and
the matches matrix M = T + T⊤ = (mij) ∈ N
n×n such that mij is the number of the
comparisons between Xi and Xj, whose outcome is given by aij . Matrices A and M also
define the tournament matrix by T = (A+M)/2.
Remark 2. Note that any ranking problem (N, T ) ∈ R can be denoted analogously as
(N,A,M) with the restriction |aij| ≤ mij for all Xi, Xj ∈ N , that is, the outcome of any
paired comparison between two objects cannot ’exceed’ their number of matches. Despite
it is not parsimonious, usually the second notation will be used in the following because
it helps to define certain ranking methods and axioms.
A ranking problem is called round-robin if mij = m for all Xi 6= Xj . The set of
round-robin ranking problems is denoted by RR. di =
∑n
j=1 mij is the total number of
comparisons of object Xi. m = maxXi,Xj∈N mij is the maximal number of comparisons in
the ranking problem.
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Matrix M can be represented by an undirected multigraph G := (V,E), where vertex
set V corresponds to the object set N , and the number of edges between objects Xi and Xj
is equal to mij . Then the degree of node Xi is di. Graph G is the comparison multigraph
associated with the ranking problem (N,A,M), however, it is independent of the results
matrix A. The Laplacian matrix L = (ℓij) ∈ R
n×n of graph G is given by ℓij = −mij for
all Xi 6= Xj and ℓii = di for all Xi ∈ N .
A path from Xk1 toXks is a sequence of objects Xk1 , Xk2, . . . , Xks such thatmkℓkℓ+1 > 0
for all ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , s − 1. Two objects are connected if there exists a path between
them. Ranking problem (N,A,M) ∈ R is said to be connected if every pair of objects is
connected. The set of connected ranking problems is denoted by RC .
A directed path from Xk1 to Xks is a sequence of objects Xk1, Xk2, . . . , Xks such that
tkℓkℓ+1 > 0 for all ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , s − 1. Ranking problem (N, T ) ∈ R is called irreducible
if there exists a directed path from Xi to Xj for all Xi, Xj ∈ N . The set of irreducible
ranking problems is denoted by RI .
Let e ∈ Rn denote the column vector with ei = 1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Let I ∈ R
n×n
be the identity matrix, O ∈ Rn×n be the zero matrix.
2.2 Ranking methods
Tournament ranking involves three main challenges. The first one is the possible appear-
ance of circular triads, when object Xi is better than Xj (that is, aij > aji), Xj is better
than Xk, but Xk is better than Xi. If preference intensities also count as in the model
above, other triplets (Xi, Xj , Xk) may produce problems, too. The second problem is that
the performance of objects compared with Xi strongly influences the observable paired
comparison outcomes aij. For example, if Xi was compared only with Xj , then its rating
may depend on other results of Xj . The third difficulty is given by the different number
of comparisons of the objects, di 6= dj. It must be realized that there is no entirely sat-
isfactory way of ranking if the number of replications of each object varies appreciably
(David, 1987, p. 1). However, the current paper does not deal with the question whether
a given dataset may be globally ranked in a meaningful way or the data are inherently
inconsistent, an issue investigated for example by Jiang et al. (2011). Since each problem
occur just if n ≥ 3, the case of two objects becomes trivial.
Now some scoring procedures are presented. They will be used only for ranking pur-
poses, so they will be called ranking methods. The first one does not take the comparison
structure into account.
Definition 1. Score: s(N,A,M) = Ae.
The following parametric procedure was constructed axiomatically by Chebotarev
(1989) and thoroughly analysed in Chebotarev (1994).
Definition 2. Generalized row sum: it is the unique solution x(ε)(N,A,M) of the system
of linear equations (I + εL)x(ε)(N,A,M) = (1 + εmn)s, where ε > 0 is a parameter.
Generalized row sum adjusts the standard score si by accounting for the performance
of objects compared with Xi, and adds an infinite depth to this argument: scores of
all objects available on a path appear in the calculation. ε indicates the importance
attributed to this correction. Generalized row sum results in score if ε→ 0.
Lemma 1. limε→0 x(ε)(N,A,M) = s(N,A,M).
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Proof. It follows from Definitions 1 and 2.
Based on some reasonableness condition, Chebotarev (1994) identifies a possible upper
bound for ε.
Definition 3. Reasonable choice of ε (Chebotarev, 1994, Proposition 5.1): The reasonable
upper bound of ε is 1/ [m(n− 2)].
The reasonable choice is not well-defined in the trivial case of n = 2, thus n ≥ 3 is
implicitly assumed in the following.
Proposition 1. If ε is within the reasonable interval (0, 1/ [m(n− 2)]], then −m(n−1) ≤
xi(ε)(N,A,M) ≤ m(n− 1) for all Xi ∈ N .
Proof. See Chebotarev (1994, Property 13).
Note that in a round-robin ranking problem −m(n − 1) ≤ si(N,A,M) ≤ m(n − 1)
holds for all Xi ∈ N .
Both the score and generalized row sum rankings are well-defined and easily com-
putable from a system of linear equations for all ranking problems (N,A,M) ∈ R.
The least squares method was suggested by Thurstone (1927) and Horst (1932).
Definition 4. Least squares: it is the solution q(N,A,M) of the system of linear equa-
tions Lq(N,A,M) = s(N,A,M) and e⊤q(N,A,M) = 0.
Generalized row sum results in least squares if ε→∞.
Lemma 2. limε→∞ x(ε)(N,A,M) = mnq(N,A,M).
Proof. It follows from Definitions 2 and 4.
Proposition 2. The least squares ranking is unique if and only if the comparison multi-
graph G of the ranking problem (N,A,M) ∈ R is connected.
Proof. See Bozo´ki et al. (2015). Chebotarev and Shamis (1999, p. 220) mention this fact
without further discussion.
An extensive analysis and a graph interpretation, and further references can be found
in Csato´ (2015).
Several scoring procedures build upon the idea of rewarding wins without punishing
losses. Two early contributions in this field are Wei (1952) and Kendall (1955). They
have been studied in social choice and game theory by Borm et al. (2002); Herings et al.
(2005); Slikker et al. (2012); Slutzki and Volij (2005, 2006), among others.
One of the most widely used methods within this framework is the fair bets method,
originally suggested by Daniels (1969) and Moon and Pullman (1970). This procedure
was axiomatically characterized by Slutzki and Volij (2005) and Slutzki and Volij (2006).
Its properties have been investigated by Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014).
Fair bets is defined with the notation (N, T ) for the sake of simplicity. Let F =
diag(T⊤e), an n× n diagonal matrix showing the number of losses for each object.
Definition 5. Fair bets: it is the solution fb(N, T ) of the system of linear equations
F−1T fb(N, T ) = fb(N, T ) and e⊤fb(N, T ) = 1.
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Proposition 3. The fair bets ranking is unique if and only if the ranking problem (N, T ) ∈
R is irreducible.
Proof. See Moon and Pullman (1970).
In the case of reducible ranking problems, Perron-Frobenius theorem does not guaran-
tee that the eigenvector corresponding to the dominant eigenvalue is strictly positive.
Fair bets judges wins against better objects to be more important than losses against
worse objects. One may argue for the opposite, which implies the dual fair bets method
(Slutzki and Volij, 2005) using the transposed tournament matrix T⊤, but in this case a
lower value is better.
Definition 6. Dual fair bets: it is dfb(N, T ) = −dfb∗(N, T ), where dfb∗(N, T ) is the
solution of the system of linear equations [diag(Te)]−1 T⊤dfb∗(N, T ) = dfb∗(N, T ) and
e⊤dfb∗(N, T ) = 1.
The transformation dfb(N, T ) = −dfb∗(N, T ) is necessary in order to ensure that
Xi  Xj ⇔ dfbi(N, T ) ≥ dfbj(N, T ) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
The axiomatization of fair bets also characterizes the dual fair bets by changing
only one property, negative responsiveness to losses with positive responsiveness to wins
(Slutzki and Volij, 2005, Remark 1). These two approaches can be seen in the case of
positional power, too, by the definition of positional power and positional weakness
(Herings et al., 2005). Similarly to the their Copeland positional value, Copeland fair
bets method is introduced as the sum of the fair bets and dual fair bets ratings.
Definition 7. Copeland fair bets: Cfb(N, T ) = fb(N, T ) + dfb(N, T ).
Now Xi  Xj ⇔ Cfbi(N, T ) ≥ Cfbj(N, T ) as earlier.
The six scoring procedures (Definitions 1-2 and 4-7) are discussed with respect to their
axiomatic properties. Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) have analysed the least squares and fair
bets methods, as well as generalized row sum with the parameter ε = 1/ [m(n− 2)]. They
use a different version of the score, si/di for all Xi ∈ N .
Ranking problem (N,A,M) ∈ R can be represented by a graph such that the nodes
are the objects, k times (Xi, Xj) ∈ N ×N undirected edge means aij(= aji) = 0, mij = k,
and k times (Xi, Xj) ∈ N ×N directed edge means k comparison with maximal intensity,
that is, aij = k (aji = −k), mij = k. We think it helps in understanding the examples.
Figure 1: Ranking problem of Example 1
X1 X2
X3
X4
X5
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Example 1. (Chebotarev, 1994, Example 2) Let (N,A,M) ∈ R be the ranking problem
in Figure 1 with the set of objects N = {X1, X2, X3, X4, X5}.
The corresponding tournament, results and matches matrices are as follows
T =


0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0.5 0 0
0 0.5 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0


, A =


0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 −1 0 1
−1 0 1 −1 0


, M =


0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0


.
Table 1: Generalized row sum vectors x(ε) of Example 1
ε 0 1/100 1/4 1/3 1 5 →∞
X1 1.0000 1.0296 1.7165 2.2649 2.4242 3.4369 4.0000
X2 0.0000 −0.0001 −0.0613 −0.1917 −0.2424 −0.6819 −1.0000
X3 0.0000 −0.0099 −0.2452 −0.4314 −0.4848 −0.8183 −1.0000
X4 0.0000 −0.0100 −0.2759 −0.4878 −0.5455 −0.8609 −1.0000
X5 −1.0000 −1.0096 −1.1341 −1.1540 −1.1515 −1.0757 −1.0000
The solutions with generalized row sum for various values of ε are given in Table 1.
Here m = 1 and n = 5, thus ε = 1/3 is the reasonable upper bound by Definition 3. The
ranking of the objects is X1 ≻ X2 ≻ X3 ≻ X4 ≻ X5 for all positive parameters since X1
dominates X5, which effects X3 and X4 through the circular triad (X3, X4, X5). However,
X3 has a draw against X2. Note that X2 ∼ X3 ∼ X4 for the score (ε → 0) and least
squares methods (ε → ∞), referring to a kind of neglect of the comparison between X2
and X3.
Example 1 is an irreducible ranking problem, so fair bets rating is not unique. Nev-
ertheless, a ranking can be obtained by the application of its extension according to
Slutzki and Volij (2005): X1 is the best object as no other has any chance to defeat it,
and the remaining four form an irreducible component. It results in X1 ≻ (X2 ∼ X3 ∼
X4 ∼ X5), which coincides with the one from least squares. Similarly, both dual fair bets
and Copeland fair bets give X1 ≻ (X2 ∼ X3 ∼ X4 ∼ X5).
Because of Propositions 2 and 3, we restrict our analysis to the class of connected
ranking problems RC , and to the set of irreducible ranking problems RI in the case of
fair bets. In ranking problems without a connected comparison multigraph, the rating of
all objects on a common scale seems to be arbitrary.
2.3 Structural invariance properties
The main discussion requires the knowledge of some basic axioms already introduced.
Definition 8. Neutrality (NEU) (Young, 1974): Let (N,A,M) ∈ R be a ranking problem
and σ : N → N be a permutation on the set of objects. Let σ(N,A,M) ∈ R be the ranking
problem obtained from (N,A,M) by this permutation. Scoring method f : R → Rn is
neutral if fi(N,A,M) ≥ fj(N,A,M) ⇔ fσi [σ(N,A,M)] ≥ fσj [σ(N,A,M)] holds for all
Xi, Xj ∈ N .
Neutrality is a simple independence of labelling of the objects, and was called anonymity
in Bouyssou (1992); Slutzki and Volij (2005); Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014). It is equivalent
to the requirement that the permutation of two objects do not affect the ranking.
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Remark 3. Let f : R→ Rn be a neutral scoring procedure. If for the objects Xi, Xj ∈ N ,
mij = 0, and aik = ajk, mik = mjk hold for all Xk ∈ N \ {Xi, Xj}, then fi(N,A,M) =
fj(N,A,M) (Bouyssou, 1992, p. 62).
Remark 3 claims that two indistinguishable objects have the same rank.
Lemma 3. All methods presented above satisfy NEU .
Proof. It follows from their definitions.
Definition 9. Symmetry (SYM) (Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al., 2014): Let (N,A,M) ∈ R be
a ranking problem such that A = O. Scoring method f : R → Rn is symmetric if
fi(N,A,M) = fj(N,A,M) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
Symmetry does not require that objects Xi and Xj have the same number of compar-
isons (di = dj). Young (1974) and Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981, Axiom 4) have intro-
duced the property cancellation for round-robin ranking problems, which coincides with
symmetry on this set.
Lemma 4. All methods presented above satisfy SYM .
Proof. It follows from their definitions.
Definition 10. Inversion (INV ) (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1998): Let (N,A,M) ∈ R
be a ranking problem. Scoring method f : R → Rn is invertible if fi(N,A,M) ≥
fj(N,A,M)⇔ fi(N,−A,M) ≤ fj(N,−A,M) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
Inversion means that taking the opposite of all results changes the ranking accordingly.
It establishes a uniform treatment of victories and defeats.
Remark 4. Let f : R → Rn be a scoring procedure satisfying INV . Then fi(N,A,M) >
fj(N,A,M)⇔ fi(N,−A,M) < fj(N,−A,M) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
The following result was mentioned by Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014, p. 150).
Corollary 1. INV implies SYM .
Lemma 5. The score, generalized row sum and least squares methods satisfy INV .
Proof. It is an immediate consequence of s(N,−A,M) = −s(N,A,M).
Lemma 6. Fair bets and dual fair bets methods do not satisfy INV even on the set RR.
Proof. See Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014, Example 4.4) for fair bets. The same counterex-
ample with a transposed tournament matrix proves the statement for dual fair bets.
Fair bets and dual fair bets violate inversion because of the different treatment of
victories and losses. The potential problem can be seen still on the most simple domain
of round-robin ranking problems. However, their appropriate aggregation eliminates this
strange feature, the major weakness of fair bets according to Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014,
p. 164).
Lemma 7. Copeland fair bets satisfies INV .
Proof. Consider the ranking problems (N, T ) and (N, T⊤). Cfb(N, T ) = fb(N, T ) +
dfb(N, T ) = −dfb(N, T⊤)− fb(N, T⊤) = −Cfb(N, T⊤).
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3 Axioms of additivity
This section reviews axioms of additivity, that is, the implications of summing two ranking
problems for the ranking. Two new properties will be introduced in the wake of two known
requirements. The restricted domain of round-robin ranking problems will be investigated,
too.
3.1 Properties already introduced
As a first step some results of the existing literature is collected and refined.
Definition 11. Consistency (CS) (Young, 1974): Let (N,A,M), (N,A′,M ′) ∈ R be
two ranking problems and Xi, Xj ∈ N be two objects. Let f : R → R
n be a scoring
procedure such that fi(N,A,M) ≥ fj(N,A,M) and fi(N,A
′,M ′) ≥ fj(N,A
′,M ′). f is
called consistent if fi(N,A+A
′,M+M ′) ≥ fj(N,A+A
′,M+M ′), furthermore, fi(N,A+
A′,M +M ′) > fj(N,A + A
′,M +M ′) if fi(N,A,M) > fj(N,A,M) or fi(N,A
′,M ′) >
fj(N,A
′,M ′).
CS is the most general and intuitive version of additivity: if Xi is not worse than Xj
in both ranking problems, this should not change after adding them up. Young (1974)
used it only in the case of round-robin tournaments.
Lemma 8. The score method satisfies CS.
Proof. It follows from Definition 1.
Proposition 4. The generalized row sum and least squares methods violate CS.
Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014, Example 4.2) have shown the violation of a weaker prop-
erty called order preservation for the least squares and generalized row sum with ε =
1/ [m(n− 2)].1
Figure 2: Ranking problems of Example 2
(a) Ranking problem (N, A, M)
X1
X2
X3
X4
(b) Ranking problem (N, A′, M ′)
X1
X2
X3
X4
Proof.
1 Order preservation contains the further requirement of di/dj = d
′
i/d
′
j for all Xi, Xj ∈ N , that is,
the ratio of the matches is equal in the ranking problems added.
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Example 2. Let (N,A,M), (N,A′,M ′) ∈ R be the ranking problems in Figure 2 with
the set of objects N = {X1, X2, X3, X4} and tournament matrices
T =


0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0

 and T
′ =


0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0

 .
Let (N,A′′,M ′′) = (N,A+ A′,M +M ′) ∈ R be the sum of these two ranking problems.
Let x(ε)(N,A,M) = x(ε), x(ε)(N,A′,M ′) = x(ε)′, x(ε)(N,A′′,M ′′) = x(ε)′′ and
q(N,A,M) = q, q(N,A′,M ′) = q′, q(N,A′′,M ′′) = q′′. Now n = 4, m = 2, m′ = 1, and
m′′ = 3. Therefore
x1(ε) = x2(ε) = −
1 + 14ε+ 56ε2 + 64ε3
1 + 12ε+ 44ε2 + 48ε3
, and
x1(ε)
′ = x2(ε)
′ = −1, but
x1(ε)
′′ − x2(ε)
′′ = −
2ε+ 44ε2 + 240ε3
1 + 22ε+ 154ε2 + 340ε3
< 0.
It implies that X1 ∼
x(ε)
(N,A,M) X2 and X1 ∼
x(ε)
(N,A′,M ′) X2, however, X1 ≺
x(ε)
(N,A′′,M ′′) X2. Gener-
alized row sum is not consistent for any ε.
For the least squares method on the basis of Lemma 2:
q1 =
limε→∞ x1(ε)
mn
= −
64
48
·
1
2 · 4
= −
1
6
=
limε→∞ x2(ε)
mn
= q2, and
q′1 =
limε→∞ x1(ε)
′
m′n
= −
1
4
=
limε→∞ x2(ε)
′
m′n
= q′2, but
q′′1 − q
′′
2 =
limε→∞ [x1(ε)
′′ − x2(ε)
′′]
m′′n
= −
240
340
·
1
3 · 4
= −
1
17
< 0.
Hence X1 ∼
q
(N,A,M) X2 and X1 ∼
q
(N,A′,M ′) X2, but X1 ≺
q
(N,A′′,M ′′) X2.
We will return later to the examination of fair bets and connected methods.
Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) also discusses the following, strongly restricted version of
additivity.
Definition 12. Flatness preservation (FP ) (Slutzki and Volij, 2005): Let (N,A,M),
(N,A′,M ′) ∈ R be two ranking problems. Let f : R → Rn be a scoring procedure such
that fi(N,A,M) = fj(N,A,M) and fi(N,A
′,M ′) = fj(N,A
′,M ′) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N . f
preserves flatness if fi(N,A+ A
′,M +M ′) = fj(N,A+ A
′,M +M ′) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
FP demands additivity only for problems where all objects are ranked uniformly. It
is used by Slutzki and Volij (2005) for the characterization of fair bets.
Corollary 2. CS implies FP .
Proof. It follows from Definitions 11 and 12.
Lemma 9. The score, generalized row sum and least squares methods satisfy FP .
It had been shown in Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014, Corollary 4.3) for the least squares,
and in Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014, Proposition 4.2) for generalized row sum with ε =
1/ [m(n− 2)].
10
Proof. The score method preserves flatness due to Lemma 8 and Corollary 2.
If xi(ε)(N,A,M) = xj(ε)(N,A,M) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N , then x(ε)(N,A,M) = 0. We
prove that s(N,A,M) = 0 ⇔ x(ε)(N,A,M) = 0. si(N,A,M) = sj(N,A,M) for all
Xi, Xj ∈ N implies s(N,A,M) = 0, therefore x(ε)(N,A,M) = 0. On the other hand,
x(ε)(N,A,M) = 0 implies (1 + εmn)s(N,A,M) = 0, so s(N,A,M) = 0.
The same argument can be applied in the case of least squares.
Lemma 10. Fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets methods satisfy FP .
Proof. See Slutzki and Volij (2005, Theorem 1) for the fair bets. According to Slutzki and Volij
(2005, Remark 1), it is true for dual fair bets, too. It implies that Copeland fair bets also
preserves flatness.
To conclude, among the ranking procedures discussed, only the score method satisfies
the strongest possible version of additivity (it will be shown later that fair bets and its
peers breaak consistency). However, all of them meets an almost trivial property called
flatness preservation. It remains to be seen how they behave between these extremities.
3.2 Two new requirements
All objects ranked uniformly seems to be a tough condition in FP , therefore it makes
sense to require additivity on a larger set. An obvious choice can be that only the objects
involved are ranked equally.
Definition 13. Equality preservation (EP ): Let (N,A,M), (N,A′,M ′) ∈ R be two rank-
ing problems and Xi, Xj ∈ N be two objects. Let f : R→ R
n be a scoring procedure such
that fi(N,A,M) = fj(N,A,M) and fi(N,A
′,M ′) = fj(N,A
′,M ′). f preserves equality
if fi(N,A+ A
′,M +M ′) = fj(N,A+ A
′,M +M ′).
Corollary 3. CS implies EP .
EP implies FP .
Proof. It follows from Definitions 11 and 13, and Definitions 12 and 13, respectively.
Lemma 11. The score method satisfies EP .
Proof. It comes from Lemma 8 and Corollary 3.
Lemma 12. The generalized row sum and least squares methods violate EP .
Proof. In Example 2, X1 ∼
x(ε)
(N,A,M) X2 and X1 ∼
q
(N,A,M) X2 as well as X1 ∼
x(ε)
(N,A′,M ′) X2
and X1 ∼
q
(N,A′,M ′) X2, but X1 ≺
x(ε
(N,A′′,M ′′) X2 and X1 ≺
q
(N,A′′,M ′′) X2.
Proposition 5. Fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets methods violate EP .
Proof.
Example 3. Let (N, T ), (N, T ′) ∈ R be the ranking problems in Figure 3 with the set of
objects N = {X1, X2, X3, X4} and tournament matrices
T =


0 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.5 0 1 0.5
0.5 0 0 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.5 0

 and T
′ =


0 1 0.5 0.5
0 0 0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5 0 0
0.5 0.5 1 0

 .
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Figure 3: Ranking problems of Example 3
(a) Ranking problem (N, T )
X1
X2
X3
X4
(b) Ranking problem (N, T ′)
X1
X2
X3
X4
Table 2: Fair bets and associated rating vectors of Example 3
fb(T ) dfb(T ) Cfb(T ) fb(T ′) dfb(T ′) Cfb(T ′) fb(T ′′) dfb(T ′′) Cfb(T ′′)
X1 1/4 −1/4 0 3/8 −1/8 1/4 163/512 −101/512 31/256
X2 3/8 −1/8 1/4 1/8 −3/8 −1/4 117/512 −115/512 1/256
X3 1/8 −3/8 −1/4 1/8 −3/8 −1/4 75/512 −205/512 −65/256
X4 1/4 −1/4 0 3/8 −1/8 1/4 157/512 −91/512 33/256
Let (N, T ′′) = (N, T + T ′) ∈ R be the sum of these two ranking problems.
The rating vectors are given in Table 2: X1 ∼(N,T ) X4 and X1 ∼(N,T ′) X4 for the three
methods, but X1 ≻
fb
(N,T ′′) X4, X1 ≺
dfb
(N,T ′′) X4, and X1 ≺
Cfb
(N,T ′′) X4.
Lemma 13. Fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets methods violate CS.
Proof. It comes from Proposition 5 and Corollary 3.
Another obvious restriction on CS can be to allow only for the combination of ranking
problems with the same matches matrix, when the interaction of different comparison
multigraphs is eliminated.
Definition 14. Result consistency (RCS): Let (N,A,M), (N,A′,M) ∈ R be two ranking
problems and Xi, Xj ∈ N be two objects. Let f : R → R
n be a scoring procedure such
that fi(N,A,M) ≥ fj(N,A,M) and fi(N,A
′,M) ≥ fj(N,A
′,M). f is called result
consistent if fi(N,A + A
′, 2M) ≥ fj(N,A + A
′, 2M), furthermore, fi(N,A + A
′, 2M) >
fj(N,A+ A
′, 2M) if fi(N,A,M) > fj(N,A,M) or fi(N,A
′,M) > fj(N,A
′,M).
Corollary 4. CS implies RCS.
Proof. It follows from Definitions 11 and 14.
Proposition 6. RCS and SYM imply INV .
Proof. Consider a ranking problem (N,A,M) ∈ R with fi(N,A,M) ≥ fj(N,A,M) for
objects Xi, Xj ∈ N . If fi(N,−A,M) > fj(N,−A,M), then fi(N,O, 2M) > fj(N,O, 2M)
due to RCS, which contradicts to SYM . Therefore fi(N,−A,M) ≤ fj(N,−A,M).
Corollary 5. CS and SYM imply INV .
Proof. It follows from Proposition 6 and Corolllary 4.
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Corollary 5 was proved by Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981, Lemma 1) in the case of
round-robin ranking problems (on the set RR), when CS is equivalent to RCS and SYM
is an almost trivial condition.
Lemma 14. The score method satisfies RCS.
Proof. It can be derived from Lemma 8 and Corollary 4.
Proposition 7. The least squares method satisfies RCS.
Proof. Let q(N,A,M) = q, q(N,A′,M) = q′ and q(N,A+A′,M+M) = q′′. It is shown
that 2q′′ = q + q′. The Laplacian matrix of the comparison multigraph associated with
matches matrix 2M is 2L, so
2Lq′′ = s(N,A + A′,M +M) = s(N,A,M) + s(N,A′,M) = L (q + q′)
as well as e⊤q′′ = e⊤ [(1/2)q + (1/2)q′] = 0.
Regarding the generalized row sum, two cases should be distinguished by the parameter
choice.
Proposition 8. The generalized row sum method with a fixed ε may violate RCS.
Figure 4: Ranking problem of Example 4
X1
X2X3
Proof.
Example 4. Let (N,A,M) ∈ R be the ranking problem in Figure 4 with the set of
objects N = {X1, X2, X3} and tournament matrix
T =


0 1.5 0.5
0.5 0 3
0.5 0 0

 .
Here m = 3 and n = 3, therefore the reasonable upper bound of ε is 1/3. Let choose
it as a fixed parameter:
x(1/3)(N,A,M) = [2.0000; 2.0000; −4.0000]⊤ , and
x(1/3)(N, 2A, 2M) = [4.5352; 3.9437; −8.4789]⊤ ,
implying X1 ∼
x(1/3)
(N,A,M) X2 but X1 ≻
x(1/3)
(N,2A,2M) X2.
Now allow ε to depend on the matches matrix M .
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Proposition 9. The generalized row sum method satisfies RCS if ε is inversely propor-
tional to the number of added ranking problems.
Proof. Let x(ε)(N,A,M) = x(ε), x(ε)(N,A′,M) = x(ε)′ and x(ε)(N,A+A′,M +M) =
x(ε)′′. It yields from some basic calculations:
x(ε/2)′′ = (1 + εmn)(I + εL)−1s(N,A+ A′,M +M) =
= (1 + εmn)(I + εL)−1 [s(N,A,M) + s(N,A′,M)] = x(ε) + x(ε)′.
Proposition 9 suggests that generalized row sum should be applied with a parameter
somewhat inversely proportional to the number of comparisons.
Remark 5. Generalized row sum with ε at the reasonable upper bound of 1/ [m(n− 2)]
satisfies RCS.
Lemma 15. Fair bets and dual fair bets methods violate RCS.
Proof. It is a consequence of Lemmata 4 and 6 together with Proposition 6: since they
meet SYM but violate INV , they cannot satisfy RCS.
Proposition 10. Copeland fair bets method violates RCS.
Figure 5: Ranking problems of Example 5
(a) Ranking problem (N, T )
X1
X2X3
(b) Ranking problem (N, T ′)
X1
X2X3
Proof.
Example 5. Let (N, T ), (N, T ′) ∈ R be the ranking problems in Figure 5 with the set of
objects N = {X1, X2, X3}, tournament and matches matrices
T =


0 3 0
0 0 1
4 0 0

 , T ′ =


0 1 2
2 0 0
2 1 0

 and M = M ′ =


0 3 4
3 0 1
4 1 0

 .
Let (N, T ′′) = (N, T + T ′) ∈ R be the sum of these two ranking problems.
The rating vectors are given in Table 3: X1 ≺
Cfb
(N,T ) X2 and X1 ≺
Cfb
(N,T ′) X2, but
X1 ≻
Cfb
(N,T ′′) X2.
Strengthening of flatness preservation in order to get EP seems to be futile. It is not
surprising since equal rating of two objects may occur accidentally. On the other side,
restricting consistency by filtering out the comparison structure proves to be fruitful, at
least in the case of least squares and generalized row sum with a proper parameter choice.
But it is not enough to achieve positive results even for Copeland fair bets, which violates
result consistency still in the most simple instance of three objects.
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Table 3: Fair bets and associated rating vectors of Example 5
fb(T ) dfb(T ) Cfb(T ) fb(T ′) dfb(T ′) Cfb(T ′) fb(T ′′) dfb(T ′′) Cfb(T ′′)
X1 3/19 −1/3 −10/57 2/7 −6/15 −12/105 7/29 −2/6 −16/174
X2 4/19 −1/3 −7/57 2/7 −5/15 −5/105 6/29 −3/6 −51/174
X3 12/19 −1/3 17/57 3/7 −4/15 17/105 16/29 −1/6 67/174
3.3 The round-robin case
Another weakening of consistency is offered by restricting its domain to a properly chosen
subset of ranking problems. Now the special case of round-robin ranking problems is
analysed, when all pairs of objects have the same number of comparisons, therefore a
significant difficulty of paired-comparison based ranking is eliminated. Note that the set
RR is closed under summation.
Lemma 16. The generalized row sum and least squares methods satisfy CS (therefore
EP and RCS) on the set RR.
Proof. Due to axioms agreement (Chebotarev, 1994, Property 3) and score consistency
(Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al., 2014), both the generalized row sum and least squares methods
coincide with the score on this set of problems, so Lemma 8 holds.
Lemma 16 shows that lack of additivity in Example 2 is due to the different structure
of the comparison multigraphs.
Lemma 17. Fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets methods violate EP even on
the set RR.
Proof. Both (N, T ) and (N, T ′) are round-robin ranking problems in Example 3.
Lemma 18. Fair bets and dual fair bets methods violate RCS on the set RR.
Proof. The argument of Lemma 15 is valid because they violate INV on the set RR
according to Lemma 6.
Proposition 11. Copeland fair bets methods violate RCS on the set RR.
Figure 6: Ranking problems of Example 6
(a) Ranking problem (N, A)
X1
X2
X3
X4
(b) Ranking problem (N, A′)
X1
X2
X3
X4
Proof.
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Example 6. Let (N, T ), (N, T ′) ∈ R be the ranking problems in Figure 6 with the set of
objects N = {X1, X2, X3, X4}, tournament and matches matrices
T =


0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0.5
0 0 0 1
1 0.5 0 0

 , T
′ =


0 0 0.5 0.5
1 0 0.5 1
0.5 0.5 0 0
0.5 0 1 0

 and M =M
′ =


0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0

 .
Let (N, T ′′) = (N, T + T ′) ∈ RR be the sum of these two ranking problems.
Table 4: Fair bets and associated rating vectors of Example 6
fb(T ) dfb(T ) Cfb(T ) fb(T ′) dfb(T ′) Cfb(T ′) fb(T ′′) dfb(T ′′) Cfb(T ′′)
X1 1/17 −6/19 −83/323 5/64 −23/64 −9/32 17/236 −79/244 −906/3599
X2 10/17 −1/19 173/323 39/64 −5/64 17/32 145/236 −15/244 1990/3599
X3 2/17 −7/19 −81/323 11/64 −25/64 −7/32 31/236 −97/244 −958/3599
X4 4/17 −5/19 −9/323 9/64 −11/64 −1/32 43/236 −53/244 −126/3599
The rating vectors are given in Table 4: X1 ≺
Cfb
(N,T ) X3 and X1 ≺
Cfb
(N,T ′) X3, but
X1 ≻
Cfb
(N,T ′′) X3.
Lemma 19. Fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets methods violate CS on the
set RR.
Proof. It comes from Lemma 18 and Proposition 11 together with Corollary 4.
In the case of round-robin ranking problems, generalized row sum and least squares co-
incide with the score, so they have a ’perfect’ performance regarding additivity. Rankings
according to fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets may be reversed by adding
two round-robin ranking problems even if there are only four objects, despite the latter
satisfies inversion.
4 Additivity and irrelevant comparisons
From the viewpoint of additivity, score method seems to be flawless. However, consistency
may have some unintended consequences, which are difficult to accept. This section deals
with the connection of additivity with other axioms.
4.1 Independence of irrelevant matches and results
Definition 15. Independence of irrelevant matches (IIM): Let (N, T ) ∈ R be a ranking
problem and Xi, Xj, Xk, Xℓ ∈ N be four different objects. Let f : R → R
n be a scoring
procedure such that fi(N, T ) ≥ fj(N, T ) and (N, T
′) ∈ R be a ranking problem identical
to (N, T ) except for t′kℓ 6= tkℓ. f is called independent of irrelevant matches if fi(N, T
′) ≥
fj(N, T
′).
Remark 6. Property IIM has a meaning if n ≥ 4.
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Sequential application of independence of irrelevant matches can lead to any ranking
problem (N, T ′) ∈ R, for which t′gh = tgh if {Xg, Xh} ∩ {Xi, Xj} 6= ∅, but all other paired
comparisons are arbitrary. IIM means that all comparisons not involving the two objects
chosen are irrelevant from the perspective of their relative ranking.
This property appears as independence in Rubinstein (1980, Axiom III) and Nitzan and Rubinstein
(1981, Axiom 5) in the case of round-robin ranking problems. The name independence of ir-
relevant matches was introduced by Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014)., Altman and Tennenholtz
(2008, Definition 8.4) use a stronger axiom called Arrow’s independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives by permitting modifications of comparisons involving Xi and Xj if tih − t
′
ih =
tjh − t
′
jh holds for all Xh ∈ N \ {Xi, Xj}.
Decomposition of the tournament matrix into the results matrix A and matches matrix
M makes possible to weaken IIM .
Definition 16. Independence of irrelevant results (IIR): Let (N,A,M) ∈ R be a ranking
problem and Xi, Xj, Xk, Xℓ ∈ N be four different objects. Let f : R → R
n be a scoring
procedure such that fi(N,A,M) ≥ fj(N,A,M) and (N,A
′,M) ∈ R be a ranking problem
identical to (N,A,M) except for the result a′kℓ 6= akℓ. f is called independent of irrelevant
results if fi(N,A
′,M) ≥ fj(N,A
′,M).
Sequential application of independence of irrelevant matches can result in any ranking
problem (N,A′,M) ∈ R, for which a′gh = agh if {Xg, Xh} ∩ {Xi, Xj} 6= ∅, but all other
paired comparisons are arbitrary. However, this axiom does not allow for a change in
the number of matches between two objects (in the case of IIM , t′kℓ 6= tkℓ means that
a′kℓ 6= akℓ and m
′
kℓ 6= mkℓ may occur).
Note also that IIR does not affect the connectedness of the ranking problem, however,
it may influence irreducibility.
Corollary 6. IIM implies IIR.
Proof. It follows from Definitions 15 and 16.
Remark 7. IIM and IIR coincide on the set of round-robin ranking problems RR.
Lemma 20. The score method satisfies IIM .
Proof. It follows from Definition 1.
Proposition 12. The generalized row sum, least squares, fair bets, dual fair bets and
Copeland fair bets methods violate IIR.
Proof.
Example 7. Let (N,A,M), (N,A′,M) ∈ R be the ranking problems in Figure 7 with
set of objects N = {X1, X2, X3, X4}, tournament and matches matrices
T =


0 0.5 0 0.5
0.5 0 0.5 0
0 0.5 0 0
0.5 0 1 0

 , T
′ =


0 0.5 0 0.5
0.5 0 0.5 0
0 0.5 0 1
0.5 0 0 0

 and M =M
′ =


0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0

 ,
where a′34 6= a34 but m
′
34 = m34.
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Figure 7: Ranking problems of Example 7
(a) Ranking problem (N, A, M)
X1
X2
X3
X4
(b) Ranking problem (N, A′, M)
X1
X2
X3
X4
IIM requires that f1(N,A,M) ≥ f2(N,A,M) ⇔ f1(N,A
′,M) ≥ f2(N,A
′,M). Let
x(ε)(N,A,M) = x(ε), x(ε)(N,A′,M ′) = x(ε)′ and q(N,A,M) = q, q(N,A′,M ′) = q′.
Here m = 1 and n = 4, therefore
x1(ε) = x2(ε)
′ = (1 + εmn)
ε
(1 + 2ε)(1 + 4ε)
=
ε
1 + 2ε
and
x1(ε)
′ = x2(ε) = (1 + εmn)
−ε
(1 + 2ε)(1 + 4ε)
=
−ε
1 + 2ε
,
that is, X1 ≻
x(ε)
(N,A,M) X2 but X1 ≺
x(ε)
(N,A′,M) X2.
For the least squares method, on the basis of Lemma 2:
q1 =
limε→∞ x1(ε)
mn
= q′2 =
limε→∞ x2(ε)
′
mn
=
1
2
·
1
1 · 4
=
1
8
and
q′1 =
limε→∞ x1(ε)
′
mn
= q2 =
limε→∞ x2(ε)
mn
= −
1
2
·
1
1 · 4
= −
1
8
.
Hence X1 ≻
q
(N,A,M) X2 but X1 ≺
q
(N,A′,M) X2.
Table 5: Fair bets and associated rating vectors of Example 7
fb(N, T ) dfb(N, T ) Cfb(N, T ) fb(N, T ′) dfb(N, T ′) Cfb(N, T ′)
X1 5/16 −3/16 1/8 3/16 −5/16 −1/8
X2 3/16 −5/16 −1/8 5/16 −3/16 1/8
X3 1/16 −7/16 −3/8 7/16 −1/16 3/8
X4 7/16 −1/16 3/8 1/16 −7/16 −3/8
The other three rating vectors are given in Table 5: X1 ≻(N,T ) X2 and X1 ≺(N,T ′) X2
for the three methods.
Remark 8. The two ranking problems of Example 7 coincide with the permutation σ(X1) =
X2 and σ(X3) = X4. Then independence of irrelevant matches demands that f1(N,A,M) =
f2(N,A,M), violated by all ranking methods discussed except for the score.
Lemma 21. The generalized row sum, least squares, fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland
fair bets methods violate IIM .
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Proof. It comes from Proposition 12 and Corollary 6.
Lemma 22. The generalized row sum and least squares methods satisfy IIM on the set
RR.
Proof. Due to axioms agreement (Chebotarev, 1994, Property 3) and score consistency
(Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al., 2014), both the generalized row sum and least squares methods
coincide with the score on this set of problems, so Lemma 20 holds.
Proposition 13. Fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets methods violate IIR
(IIM) even on the set RR.
Figure 8: Ranking problems of Example 8
(a) Ranking problem (N, T )
X1
X2
X3
X4
(b) Ranking problem (N, T ′)
X1
X2
X3
X4
Proof.
Example 8. Let (N, T ), (N, T ′) ∈ RR be the round-robin ranking problems in Figure 8
with the set of objects N = {X1, X2, X3, X4}, tournament and matches matrices
T =


0 1 0 0.5
0 0 0.5 1
1 0.5 0 0
0.5 0 1 0

 , T
′ =


0 1 0 0.5
0 0 0.5 1
1 0.5 0 1
0.5 0 0 0

 and M =M
′ =


0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0

 ,
where a′34 6= a34 but m
′
34 6= m34.
Table 6: Fair bets and associated rating vectors of Example 8
fb(N, T ) dfb(N, T ) Cfb(N, T ) fb(N, T ′) dfb(N, T ′) Cfb(N, T ′)
X1 1/4 −1/4 0 5/32 −7/32 −1/16
X2 1/4 −1/4 0 7/32 −5/32 1/16
X3 1/4 −1/4 0 19/32 −1/32 9/16
X4 1/4 −1/4 0 1/32 −19/32 −9/16
IIR requires that f1(N,A,M) ≥ f2(N,A,M) ⇔ f1(N,A
′,M) ≥ f2(N,A
′,M). The
rating vectors are given in Table 6: X1 (N,T ) X2 and X1 ≺(N,T ′) X2 for the three
methods.
Hence, similarly to consistency, generalized row sum and least squares satisfy IIR on
the set of round-robin ranking problems, while fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair
bets break it even on this restricted domain.
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4.2 Connection to additivity
Take a look at Example 7 (Figure 7). It seems strange to require that objects X1 and
X2 have the same rank in both problems, which is an implication of IIM . Therefore,
Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014, p. 165) consider independence of irrelevant matches to be a
drawback of the score method because outside the subdomain of round-robin ranking
problems, it makes sense if the scoring procedure is responsive to the strength of the
opponents. However, it turns out that IIM is closely linked to additivity.
Theorem 1. NEU , SYM and CS imply IIM .
Proof. For the round-robin case, see Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981, Lemma 3).
Assume to the contrary, and let (N,A,M) ∈ R be a ranking problem, Xi, Xj, Xk, Xℓ ∈
N be four different objects such that fi(N,A,M) ≥ fj(N,A,M), and (N,A
′,M ′) ∈ R
is identical to (N,A,M) except for the result a′kℓ 6= akℓ and match m
′
kℓ 6= mkℓ such that
fi(N,A
′,M ′) < fj(N,A
′,M ′).
Corollary 5 implies that a symmetric and consistent scoring procedure satisfies INV ,
hence fi(N,−A,M) ≤ fj(N,−A,M). Denote by σ : N → N the permutation σ(Xi) =
Xj, σ(Xj) = Xi, and σ(Xk) = Xk for all Xk ∈ N \ {Xi, Xj}. Neutrality implies
fi [σ(N,A,M)] ≤ fj [σ(N,A,M)], and fi [σ(N,−A
′,M ′)] < fj [σ(N,−A
′,M ′)] due to
inversion and Remark 4. With the definitions A′′ = σ(A) − σ(A′) − A + A′ = O and
M ′′ = σ(M) + σ(M ′) +M +M ′,
(N,A′′,M ′′) = σ(N,A,M) + σ(N,−A′,M ′)− (N,A,M) + (N,A′,M ′).
Symmetry implies fi(N,A
′′,M ′′) = fj(N,A
′′,M ′′) since A′′ = 0, but fi(N,A
′′,M ′′) <
fj(N,A
′′,M ′′) from consistency, which is a contradiction.
Remark 9. NEU , SYM and RCS do not imply IIR despite that the proof of The-
orem 1 can almost be followed. According to Proposition 6, a symmetric and result
consistent scoring procedure also satisfies INV , but result consistency does not provide
fi(N,A
′′,M ′′) < fj(N,A
′′,M ′′) even if M = M ′ (guaranteed in the case of IIR) due to
M 6= σ(M) in general.
Note that M = σ(M) is equivalent to mik = mjk for all Xk ∈ N \ {Xi, Xj}. Then
NEU , SYM and RCS still imply IIR, so generalized row sum and least squares should
satisfy independence of irrelevant results with respect to such objects Xi and Xj. In
fact, according to the property homogeneous treatment of victories (Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al.,
2014), in this case they result in Xi  Xj if and only if si(N,A,M) ≥ sj(N,A,M): when
two objects have the same number of comparisons against all the other objects, they are
ranked according to their scores.2 As mik = mjk for all Xk ∈ N \ {Xi, Xj} holds for any
Xi, Xj ∈ N in round-robin ranking problems, it highlights that generalized row sum and
least squares satisfy IIM on the domain of RR.
Axioms NEU and SYM are difficult to debate, therefore Theorem 1 implies CS is a
property one would rather not have in the general case. It reinforces the significance of
Section 3; weakening of consistency seems to be desirable in order to avoid independence
of irrelevant matches (results).
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Table 7: Axiomatic properties of ranking methods
Property Score† Generalized
row sum‡
Least
squares
Fair bets /
dual fair
bets∗
Copeland
fair bets
(NEU) (✔) (✔) (✔) (✔) ✔
(SYM) (✔) (✔) (✔) (✔) ✔
(INV ) (✔) (✔) (✔) (✗) ✔
(CS) (✔) (✗) (✗) (✗) ✗
(FP ) (✔) (✔) (✔) (✔) ✔
EP ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
RCS ✔ ✔✗⋄ ✔ ✗ ✗
(IIM) (✔) (✗) (✗) (✗) ✗
IIR ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Axioms introduced in the literature and known results are in parenthesis (see the text for references);
others are our contribution
†
Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) define the score method differently; their findings are in parenthesis
‡
Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) discuss generalized row sum only for ε = [1/m(n− 2)]; their findings are
in parenthesis
∗
Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) do not analyse dual fair bets; their findings are in parenthesis
⋄
Depends on the choice of ε; the answer is positive if the parameter is inversely proportional to the
number of added ranking problems
5 Conclusions
Our results concerning the connection of the axioms and ranking methods are summarized
in Table 7. Score satisfies all properties, however, IIM is not favourable in the presence
of missing and multiple comparisons. The findings recommend to use generalized row
sum with a parameter somewhat proportional to the number of matches, for example, the
upper bound of reasonable choice 1/ [m(n− 2)]. It is not surprising given the statistical
background of the method (Chebotarev, 1994). Then generalized row sum and least
squares cannot be distinguished with respect to the properties examined.3
A drawback of fair bets (and its dual) was eliminated by the introduction of Copeland
fair bets, but it does not affect other axioms. Chebotarev and Shamis (1999)’s analysis of
self-consistent monotonicity confirm that ’manipulation’ with win-loss combining scoring
procedures is not able to correct some inherent features of this class.
It has been investigated whether the ranking methods meet the properties on the re-
stricted domain of round-robin tournaments. Since generalized row sum and least squares
coincide with the score on this set, they perform perfectly – in this case it is difficult to de-
bate IIM (IIR). However, the behaviour of fair bets and its peers remain unchanged even
on this narrow subset, so a rank reversal may occur after adding two simple round-robin
ranking problems. It seems to be a strong argument against their application.4
We have also aspired to give simple counterexamples, minimal with respect to the
2 Formally, Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) prove homogeneous treatment of victories only for generalized
row sum with ε = 1/ [m(n− 2)], but it remains valid for any ε > 0.
3 Some of their differences are highlighted by Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014).
4 Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) does not mention it as a drawback.
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number of objects and matches. It shows that the violation of these properties remains
an issue still in the case of relatively small problems.
Figure 9: Connections among the axioms
Arrows sign implication. In certain cases some axioms together determine another such as NEU+SY M+
CS ⇒ IIM . Nodes with dashed, red lines are properties introduced by us; continuous, blue lines are our
results; dashed, green lines are trivial relationships.
NEU
CS
FP
EP
RCS
SYM INV
IIM
IIR
Figure 9 gives a comprehensive picture about the axioms investigated. Three novel
properties were introduced. EP is between two extreme additivity requirements, the
severe CS and the weak FP . However, our methods show the same behaviour against
equality preservation as against consistency. The other direction of mitigating CS, result
consistency (RCS) – made possible by the differentiation of results and matches matrices
– yields more success. The new setting is also responsible for the introductione of inde-
pendence of irrelevant results, a weak form of independence of irrelevant matches already
defined. Relationships among the axioms shed light on some discoveries of Table 7: the
strong connection of IIM and CS justifies the violation of both properties, the violation
of INV by fair bets implies that it does not satisfy RCS.
At least two main directions of future research emerge. The first is to extend the scope
of the analysis with other scoring procedures. For example, Slikker et al. (2012) define
a general framework for ranking the nodes of directed graphs, resulting in fair bets as a
limit. Positional power (Herings et al., 2005) is also worth to analyse since it is similar to
least squares from a graph-theoretic point of view (Csato´, 2015). The second course is to
get some characterization results, an intended end goal of any axiomatic analysis.
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